We characterize the top trading cycles mechanism for priority-based allocation of indivisible objects when objects have general capacities. We say that a mechanism is top-priority trading-proof if the top ranked agent at any object can never benefit from obtaining (or trading for) a top priority of any agent assigned a copy of this object. This axiom captures a new way that top priorities are respected. We show that an allocation mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, recursivity, respecting top priorities and top-priority trading-proofness if and only if it is the top trading cycles mechanism.
Introduction
In priority-based allocation problems, agents not only have preferences over objects, they also have different priorities at the objects. The most prominent examples of such problems are the school choice problems. In a school choice problem, students have different priorities in obtaining a seat at each school. Different allocation mechanisms for school choice problems treat priorities in different ways. For example, in the Boston mechanism, priorities at schools are dominated by students' reported preferences in a lexicographic way. And in the famous Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (henceforth, DA) (Gale and Shapley (1962) ), since it always selects the student-optimal stable matching, it requires that no student's priority can be violated at any school, that is, if a student desires a school then no student with lower priority than her at this school should be matched to this school.
We study the top trading cycles mechanism (henceforth, TTC) for school choice problems, which is introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) based on Gale's celebrated top trading cycles algorithm (Shapley and Scarf (1974) ) defined for housing markets. This mechanism takes another perspective on how priorities should be treated. It operates as follows: in each step, each student points to her most favorite school and each school points to her top ranked student, and when cycles form, match students in the cycles with their favorite schools, remove them from the problem and then continue the same process with the remaining students and seats. We see that implicitly, this mechanism allows students to trade their priorities through a very well-structured process.
The TTC mechanism is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) ). However, unlike DA, the matching it selects might not be stable. As DA is adopted by more and more schools lately 1 , and some school districts are also considering 1 Please see Pathak and Sönmez (2013) or other recent literature for updates about the progress of school TTC as an alternative 2 , it is important to gain a better understanding of TTC, especially on the role of priorities in the mechanism.
The characterization of TTC is pioneered by Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) . When schools (objects) have unit capacity, they show that an allocation mechanism is strategyproof, Pareto efficient, and recursively respects top priorities if and only if it is the TTC mechanism. Among these axioms, respecting top priorities is newly introduced. It roughly says that if a student is top ranked at some school s, then this top priority should ensure her a seat weakly better than one at school s. This axiom is weak and intuitive; it captures a minimal implication of top priorities on allocations.
Unfortunately, when schools have general capacities, that is, when schools potentially have more than one seats, the axioms used by Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) are not sufficient for the characterization of TTC. 3 In fact, in TTC, the top ranked student at any school is not only ensured a seat at a weakly better school, but also endowed with the right to trade with any student who wants to enter this school. We see the second effect as a new way in which TTC respects top priorities and formalize it with an axiom. We say that a mechanism is top-priority trading-proof if when student i is top ranked at some school s and another student j, who is top ranked at school s 0 , is matched to school s by the mechanism, then trading priorities with j will not improve i's allocation. An advantage of this formulation is that it makes clear the exact role and form of priority tradings behind the trading cycles.
Top-priority trading-proofness is complementary to the axiom respecting top priorities. To be precise, it captures the implication of top priorities on obtaining the priorities of the others, but is silent about the implication of top priorities on allocations (which is admissions reform.
2 The New Orleans Recovery School District adopted TTC in 2012.
3 Please see Example 1 for a simple illustration.
captured by the other axiom). In particular, if an allocation mechanism is independent of priorities, that is, if the matching it selects only depends on the preferences of students, then top-priority trading-proofness is trivially satisfied.
We offer a characterization of TTC under general capacities with the help of the new axiom, together with the axioms used in Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) . We show that
for school choice problems with general capacities, an allocation mechanism satisfies the four axioms used in Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) and top-priority trading-proofness if and only if it is the TTC mechanism. The result is a direct extension of Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010)'s characterization from unit capacity to general capacities; it also highlights another implication of top priorities and clarifies the role and form of priority tradings in TTC.
Characterizations of TTC under general capacities are also studied in Dur (2012) and Morrill (2013b) . Dur (2012) 's characterization uses Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, weak consistency, mutual best, and resource monotonicity for top-ranked students. There is a strong connection between his characterization and ours: the axioms weak consistency and mutual best play similar roles as recursivity and respecting top priorities do, respectively. Thus the big difference between the characterizations is between resource monotonicity and top-priority trading-proofness. Morrill (2013b) uses two new axioms, justness and reducibility, in his characterization. As a relaxation of stability, justness captures the idea that the priority of a student at a school can be justifiably violated if it is for the good of a student with higher priority at that school. Morrill (2012) offers an alternative characterization for TTC with unit capacity and Kesten (2006) relates properties of TTC with cycles in the priority structure. Characterizations of the Boston mechanism and DA can be found in Kojima and Manea (2010) and Kojima and Ünver (2013) , respectively, among others. When schools all have unit capacity, TTC also belongs to two general classes of mechanisms studied in the literature. More specifically, the class of hierarchical exchange rules characterized by group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency and reallocation-proofness (Pápai (2000) ), and the class of "trading cycles" mechanisms characterized by group strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency (Pycia and Ünver (2011a) ).
The class of "trading cycles" mechanisms is also extended to school choice problems with general capacities in Pycia and Ünver (2011b) .
The Model

Preliminaries
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects O = fa, b, c, . . .g to a set of agents I = f1, 2, . . . , ng. Each object a 2 O has a fixed capacity (quota) q a , and each agent i 2 I demands exactly one object. We can view each object as a school with a fixed capacity of seats and view each agent as a student who demands exactly one seat. For notational convenience, when an agent is unassigned, we say that she is assigned to the null object ∅, which has unlimited capacity.
For each agent i 2 I, let P i denote her strict preference over the objects and R i the symmetric extension of P i . If agent i prefers (weakly prefers) object a to object b, we denote it as aP i b (aR i b). Each object a 2 O is coupled with a strict priority list a over I. If agent i has higher priority than agent j at object a, we denote it as i a j. We say that an agent i is a top-quota agent at a or is ranked within top-quota at a, if the rank of i in the priority list of a is less than or equal to q a .
A priority-based allocation problem is a pair (P, ), where P = (P i ) i2I is a preference profile and = ( a ) a2O is a priority profile. A matching µ : I ! O [ f∅g assigns each agent in I with exactly one object such that jfi 2 I :
for each a 2 O. An allocation mechanism ϕ selects for each problem (P, ) a matching
ϕ(P, ).
A matching ν Pareto dominates matching µ if for all i 2 I, ν(i)R i µ(i), and for some
(j). A matching µ is Pareto efficient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other
matching. An allocation mechanism ϕ is Pareto efficient if it selects a Pareto efficient matching for every problem, and ϕ is strategy-proof if ϕ(
i , P and . Similarly, ϕ is group strategy-proof if for all P, there do not
Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
The top trading cycles mechanism (TTC) for the problems we study is first proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) in the context of school choice. It is inspired by Gale's celebrated top trading cycles algorithm proposed in the context of housing markets (Shapley and Scarf (1974) ).
Given an allocation problem (P, ), the top trading cycles mechanism operates as follows:
Step 1 Each object points to its top-priority agent and each agent points to her most favorite object. Due to finiteness, cycle(s) exist. Such cycles are called top cycles. For each agent in a top cycle, assign a copy of her most favorite object to her and remove them together with their allocations from the problem.
Step 2 Each object that still has available capacity points to its top priority agent among the agents that remain, and each agent points to her most favorite object among the objects which still have available capacity. Find, match and remove the cycles as
Step 1 does.
This algorithm ends in finitely many steps and we denote the matching it produces as TTC(P, ). It is well known that TTC is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient. In its application to school choice problems, TTC is usually discussed together with the Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the Boston mechanism.
Morrill (2013a) proposes two simple variations of TTC, clinch&trade and the priorityadjusted TTC (henceforth, ATTC). Both variations shares many common properties as the regular TTC. In particular, Morrill (2013a) shows that the priority-adjusted TTC is group strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, reallocation-proof, and independent of the order in which cycles are processed.
Given an allocation problem (P, ), ATTC operates as follows:
Step 1 Let the agents and objects point to each other as in regular TTC.
Step 2 When a cycle forms, match all agents in the cycle as usual, except when some agent in the cycle is pointing to an object that ranks her within top-quota (in the original priority list). In that case, match only such agents and leave others in the cycle unmatched.
3 The Characterization
The Axioms
In this section, we introduce and review some axioms used in the literature that will also be used in our characterization of TTC.
Respecting top priorities is introduced by Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) in their characterization of TTC, when q a = 1 for all object a 2 O. An allocation mechanism ϕ respects top priorities if when some agent is assigned a copy of object a and agent i is top ranked at a, we have ϕ(P, )(i)R i a. It says that if one or more copies of object a have been assigned out, then the top ranked agent at a, agent i, must have been assigned a weakly better object.
TTC operates sequentially. This feature of TTC is captured by recursivity and weak consistency in Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) and Dur (2012) , respectively, which are essentially equivalent. We reformulate recursivity in a minimal way that suits our characterization.
Definition 1.
A top priority group of a matching µ is an ordered list of agents i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i K such
, where o k+1 is some object that top ranks i k+1 .
Let µnI 0 denote the matching of the rest of agents under µ, after removing agents in I 0 and their allocations. Given a matching µ and a top priority group I 0 of µ, we can define a subproblem (P, )nI 0 of the problem (P, ). The subproblem consists of agents and objects that remain after removing agents in I 0 together with their allocations at µ, and the priorities and preferences in new problem are natural projections of the respective priorities and preferences in (P, ).
Definition 2. An allocation mechanism ϕ satisfies recursivity if for each (P, ) and each top priority group I 0 at ϕ(P, ), ϕ((P, )nI 0 ) = ϕ(P, )nI 0 .
In the pioneering work, Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) provide a characterization of TTC when each object has exactly one copy.
Theorem 1 (Abdulkadiroglu and Che, 2010) . If q a = 1 for all a 2 O, then an allocation mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, recursivity and respecting top priorities if and only if it is TTC.
Unfortunately, when objects have general capacities, axioms used by Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) are not sufficient for the characterization of TTC. Consider a mechanism such that for any problem (P, ), it starts with running TTC as usual, and when there are in total only three or less copies of objects remain, it runs ATTC instead. We also assume that when multiple cycles appear in a step, only the one that involves the lowest indexed agent is matched and removed. This mechanism is strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and respects top priorities, due to the fact that both TTC and ATTC satisfy these properties.
It is also recursive since it potentially differs from TTC only for the last three copies of objects, and in such cases removing a top priority group from the ATTC allocation will not affect the allocation of the remaining agents. Furthermore, this mechanism is indeed different from TTC, as we show in below using a simple example (borrowed from Morrill (2013b)) with only three seats. 4
Example 1. There are two objects a and b such that q a = 2 and q b = 1, and three agents i, j and k. So the mechanism mentioned above selects the ATTC allocation. The preference profile P and priority profiles are given in the tables. The allocations of TTC and ATTC for this problem are underlined in the tables of priority profiles.
By comparing TTC(P, ) with ATTC(P, ), we see immediately that they produce different allocations and agent i is worse off in the latter, due to the loss of trading opportunity with agent k.
Top-priority Trading-proofness
To reach a general characterization, we introduce a new axiom called top-priority tradingproofness which captures a new way that top priorities are respected and is complementary to the axiom respecting top priorities.
Definition 3. An allocation mechanism ϕ is top-priority trading-proof if when agent i is
top ranked at object a, agent j is top ranked at object b, and ϕ(P, )(j) = a, then ϕ(P,
, where 0 is the new priority structure obtained from by trading the priorities of i and j at a and b while keeping all other priorities unchanged.
We explain two implications behind the definition of top-priority trading-proofness.
First, it captures the property that if agent i is top ranked at a, then if she can benefit from obtaining the top priority (at another object) of any agent j assigned a copy of a, then the benefit should have been implemented by the mechanism, so that no further gains can be made through trading priority with j. Top-priority trading-proofness represents a new way of respecting top priorities, which is not captured by the axiom respecting top priorities defined above but instead is complementary to it: since the top priority at an object ensures an assignment weakly better than that object, agents thus have the incentives to trade top priorities. Top-priority trading-proofness itself is silent about the implication of top priorities in allocations. For example, all priority-independent allocation mechanism satisfies top-priority trading-proofness. 5 Second, formulating the axiom with prioritytrading is helpful in explicitly identifying the role and form of priority tradings implemented by top trading cycles, given that respecting top priorities, strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency are satisfied.
We now illustrate that ATTC (hence the mechanism that precedes Example 1) does not satisfy priority trading-proofness.
Example 2. Note first that for the problem (P, ) in Example 1, ATTC assigns agent k to object a which top ranks agent i. Let 0 denote the new priority profile obtained after i and k trade priorities. The allocations of mechanisms are underlined in the tables of priority profiles.
By comparing ATTC(P, ) and ATTC(P, 0 ), we see that agent i's allocation im-5 An allocation mechanism ϕ is priority-independent if ϕ(P, ) = ϕ(P, 0 ) for any , 0 and P.
proves from object a to object b, after obtaining agent k's top priority at b. Therefore, ATTC is not top-priority trading-proof.
The Characterization
We are ready to provide a characterization of TTC for priority-based allocation problems with general capacities, with the help of the new axiom top-priority trading-proofness.
This characterization directly extends Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010)'s characterization of TTC when objects have unit capacity.
Theorem 2. An allocation mechanism ϕ satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, recursivity, respecting top priorities, and top-priority trading-proofness if and only if it is TTC.
Proof. Part I (Necessity).
Since it is well known in the literature that TTC satisfies strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) and Pápai (2000) ), respects top priorities (Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) ), and trivially satisfies recursivity, we only need to show that it also satisfies top-priority trading-proofness.
Let I k (P, ) be the set of agents who are matched in step k of the TTC(P, ). Suppose i is the top priority agent at o i and i 2 I k (P, ). We need to show that if agent j, who is the top priority agent of o j , is assigned to o i , then TTC(P, )R i TTC(P, 0 ), where 0 is the priority structure obtained from by switching i and j's priorities at o i and o j .
Note that during the TTC of (P, ), j is either matched in the same cycle as i or after i is matched. So in the TTC of (P, ), in any cycle that precedes i's, none of o i , o j , i and j is involved. Therefore, switching i and j's priorities at o i and o j will not affect those cycles.
That is, in the new problem, the objects that agent i desires are also removed before i is matched. Hence i cannot be improved through such priority trading.
Part II (Sufficiency).
Suppose ϕ is strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and satisfies recursivity, top-priority trading-proof, and respects top priorities. We first present the most crucial step of the proof in a proposition. Given this proposition, we can prove sufficiency inductively by applying recursivity.
Proof. Suppose instead ϕ(P, )(i) 6 = TTC(P, )(i), for some i 2 I 1 (P, ). Then jI 1 (P,
that is, i is top ranked at TTC(P, )(i) and TTC(P, )(i) is i's most preferred object. If ϕ does not assign TTC(P, )(i) to i, then respecting top priorities implies that no agent gets TTC(P, )(i). This violates the Pareto efficiency of ϕ.
..,K denote the top cycle that i is matched in TTC, that is, the cycle corresponding to I 1 (P, ). Without loss of generality, let
The TTC matching can be depicted by
Lemma 1. There exists a preference profile P 0 under which for some i M 2 I 1 (P, ), we have
Then by switching the priorities of i M and i M+1 at o M and o M+1 , we obtain a new priority profile 0 such that in the new problem (P 0 , 0 ), the set of agents I 1 (P, )nfi M g form a smaller top cycle and ϕ(P 0 , 0 )(i M+1 ) 6 = TTC(P 0 , 0 )(i M+1 ), due to top-priority trading-proofness. This allows us to induct on the size of the top trading cycle I 1 . Also note that if all objects have unit capacity, then we already have a contradiction.
, the TTC matching remains the same, and since ϕ is strategy-proof, ϕ(P 0
As i K is the top ranked agent at o K , she cannot be assigned an object worse than o K , because otherwise, due to respecting top priorities, no agent can be assigned
Pareto improvement.
is the i M we are looking for.
, then we can repeat the process and stop until we find P 0 and i M such that ϕ(P 0 , )(i M ) = ϕ(P 0 , )(i M+1 ) = o M+1 , or when none of i 2 I 1 (P, ) works. If it is the former case, we find the i M . If it is the latter case, we will
Note that at the problem (P 0 c , P c , ), respecting top priorities and Pareto efficiency ensure that for each i k 2
, then agents in I 1 (P, ) can improve among themselves without hurting others, thus ϕ is not Pareto efficient. Also, it cannot be that for all i k 2 I 1 (P,
From the above, there must be P 0 , obtained by modifying the preferences of some or all agents in I 1 (P, ) in the way of P 0 At the problem (P 0 , 0 ), the TTC matching remains the same as that of (T, ), although the original cycle c now decomposes into two parts as depicted below.
The matching ϕ(P 0 , 0 ), however, cannot assign i M+1 to o M+2 , because top-priority trading-proofness prohibits the allocation of i M+1 to improve from o M+1 to o M+2 at the priority switching.
The key observation is that ϕ(P 0 , 0 )(i M+1 ) 6 = TTC(P 0 , 0 )(i M+1 ), where i M+1 is some agent in I 1 (P 0 , 0 ). Consider the problem (P 0 , 0 ) and start over. With the same steps, we will be able to find another problem (P 00 , 00 ) and some i N , i N+1 2 I 1 (P 0 , 0 ), such that I 1 (P 00 , 00 ) = I 1 (P 0 , 0 )nfi N g and ϕ(P 00 , 00 )(i N+1 ) 6 = TTC(P 00 , 00 )(i N+1 ).
This procedure cannot go on forever. Eventually, we will reach some problem (P,¯ )
such that jI 1 (P,¯ )j = 1, and ϕ(P,¯ )(i) 6 = TTC(P,¯ )(i) for the only i 2 I 1 (P,¯ ). We have a contradiction.
)(i). If we remove agents in I 1 (P, ) together with their allocations, in the subproblem (P,ˆ ) (P, )nI 1 (P, ), since ϕ satisfies recursivity, for any i 2 I 1 (P,ˆ ), ϕ(P,
. By induction, for any k, for any i 2 I k (P, ), ϕ(P, )(i) = TTC(P, )(i). This completes the proof.
Independence of Axioms
The axioms we use to characterize TTC are independent (non-redundant) because for each axiom, there exists a mechanism that fails to satisfy it but satisfies all other axioms.
We verify this by providing the following examples of mechanisms.
Example 3. A mechanism that satisfies all other axioms but strategy-proofness: Consider the following example inspired by Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) . In the example, q b = 2, q a = q c = 1, and (P, ) is described in the tables. Consider a modification of TTC in which agent k points to her second choice in the first round of TTC for the (P, ) above, and runs the usual TTC for all other problems.
The outcome for this specific problem is marked out. We can see that this mechanism is not strategy-proof, since agent k can misreport and get b. However, it is Pareto efficient, priority trading-proof, and respects top priorities.
Example 4. A mechanism that satisfies all other axioms but Pareto efficiency: The null mechanism which always assigns ∅ to every agent.
Example 5. A mechanism that satisfies all other axioms but recursivity: Let O = fa, bg, I = fi, j, kg, and q a = q b = 1. Consider a mechanism that coincides with TTC except when objects have the same priority 1 2 3 and agents have the same preference aP i bP i ∅. In that case, run TTC as if the common priority is 1 3 2.
Example 6. A mechanism that satisfies all other axioms but top-priority trading-proofness:
Please see Example 1 and the discussion that precedes it.
Example 7. A mechanism that satisfies all other axioms but respecting top priorities:
Serial dictatorships for agents.
Conclusion
We characterize TTC by using a new axiom called top-priority trading-proofness together with the axioms used in Abdulkadiroglu and Che (2010) . Priority trading-proofness has two main features: first, it captures the idea that the top ranked student at a school has the right to benefit from obtaining the top priorities of students assigned to this school; second, it identifies the exact role and form of priority tradings that are implemented in TTC.
We believe that this characterization offers a new perspective on how TTC works, especially on how it treats priorities. Together with the characterizations offered by other researchers, we expect the application of TTC in school choice to be better understood by policy makers and general public.
